AS INSTITUIÇÕES DO FEDERALISMO: COM RESPEITO A UM QUADRO ANALÍTICO

Autores

  • David E. Wildasin Universidade de Kentucky, Lexington.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v4i1.272

Palavras-chave:

Direito Constitucional, Federalismo, Instituições

Resumo

As federações amadurecidas apresentam relativa transparência quanto a  delimitações de autoridade entre os níveis de governo, os governos subnacionais gozam de uma autonomia considerável em suas políticas de despesas, receitas e dívidas. Em outros países, os problemas de restrições orçamentárias suaves, resgates e instabilidade fiscal e financeira demonstram as dificuldades do desenho institucional de uma federação. Este artigo descreve um quadro analítico no qual os efeitos inter jurisdicionais ou jurisdicionais podem criar incentivos para governos de nível superior para intervir no controle e financiamento de governos de nível inferior ("resgates"). Essa estrutura ajuda a identificar orientações para pesquisas teóricas e empíricas que possam iluminar características importantes das instituições observadas e orientar a análise de políticas.

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Biografia do Autor

David E. Wildasin, Universidade de Kentucky, Lexington.

Professor emérito de Economia da Martin School da Universidade de Kentucky, Lexington.

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Publicado

2018-08-05

Como Citar

Wildasin, D. E. (2018). AS INSTITUIÇÕES DO FEDERALISMO: COM RESPEITO A UM QUADRO ANALÍTICO. REI - REVISTA ESTUDOS INSTITUCIONAIS, 4(1), 19–61. https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v4i1.272

Edição

v. 4 n. 1 (2018)

Seção

Dossiê

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