EXPLAINING DISSENT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR OF THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v2i2.68Keywords:
Dissent, Court’s Cohesion, Workload, Personality, Constitutional CourtsAbstract
The literature on dissent in courts points some factors as causes of reduction or increase in the amount of dissenting votes. The workload is often considered to be among the most critical of these factors. This hypothesis is supported by past studies, which found a correlation between the variables in the Brazilian Supreme Court and the SCOTUS. We found that less discussed factors, especially the individual differences between the justices’ personalities, seemed able to better explain court cohesion. In this paper we report quantitative data that supports this claim. Considering that there might be normative reasons to alter court cohesion, it is relevant to know which is the most effective way to exercise such manipulation. The results indicate that changing the way justices are nominated, taking their personalities in consideration, could be a better strategy to impact cohesion as opposed to modifying workload, as the literature commonly suggests.Downloads
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Published
2019-04-09
How to Cite
Almeida, G. da F. C. F. de, Nunes, J. L., & Chaves Filho, L. de O. (2019). EXPLAINING DISSENT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR OF THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, 2(2), 899–931. https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v2i2.68
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Section
Awarded Papers - IV International Seminar on Institutional Theory
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